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BYLAW REFORMS FOR DELAWARE'S CORPORATION LAW
BY BRETr H. MCDONNELL*
ABSTRACT
Written as part of a symposium on the Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL) in the 21st Century, this article suggests four reforms to the
DGCL Each of these reforms would help solidify the ability of shareholders
to effectively adopt bylaws that regulate decision-making procedure and
corporate governance. The four reforms are the following:
1. Amend section 109(b), and perhaps section 141(a), to clarify that
bylaws may set procedural and governance rules, but may not be
used to make substantive business decisions.
2. Amend section 141(a) to provide that shareholder bylaw or
certificate provisions may limit board discretion, thereby shielding
the board from fiduciary duty liability for actions required or
prohibited by the provisions.
3. Amend section 157(a) to clarify that bylaws may limit or regulate
the ability of boards to adopt poison pills.
4. Amend section 109 to clarify that if a shareholder bylaw so
specifies, the board may not amend or repeal that bylaw.
The first, third, and fourth changes are arguably already the rule under
existing law, but there is much uncertainty under that law, and these suggested
changes would bring more clarity. The second change responds to the
Delaware Supreme Court's recent decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Employees Pension Plan.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholder bylaw proposals have become an increasingly important
part of battles over corporate governance. Among other issues, shareholders
*Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Minnesota Law School.
'953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
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have tried to use bylaws to put in place rules for majority voting for directors,
shareholder nominations of directors, and limits on the ability of boards to
adopt poison pills.
For some of these bylaw proposals, their validity, under state law, is
unquestionable. For others, however, there is serious ambiguity under existing
Delaware law as to whether the proposed bylaws are valid. The law does not
clearly spell out rules or principles for distinguishing what matters can be
addressed in bylaws, as opposed to matters that must be addressed in the
certificate of incorporation. A very recent Delaware Supreme Court decision
has started to clear up some of the ambiguity, but in some ways it has actually
increased the uncertainty surrounding shareholder bylaws.
Beyond the question of the scope of valid bylaws, there is a further
important point of ambiguity in current Delaware law. If shareholders do
succeed in amending a corporation's bylaws, can the board of directors then
amend or repeal what the shareholders have done? Other jurisdictions make
clear that shareholders can prevent this from occurring, but in Delaware it is
currently unclear under both statutory law and common law whether share-
holders can, in their bylaws, protect against reversal by the board.
Shareholder bylaws, within reasonable limits, present a useful way for
shareholders to guard against board opportunism without going too far in
usurping board authority. Shareholders have extremely limited ways in which
they can actively take initiative to set rules of corporate governance. Bylaw
proposals are one of the only tools available to shareholders. Some clarifi-
cation of the law in this area, to give a reasonable scope for governance by-
laws, would be useful.
In particular, this article suggests four changes to Delaware statutes
regulating bylaws:
1. Amend section 109(b), and perhaps section 141(a), to clarify that
bylaws may set procedural and governance rules, but may not be
used to make substantive business decisions.
2. Amend section 141(a) to provide that shareholder bylaw or
certificate provisions may limit board discretion, thereby shielding
the board from fiduciary duty liability for actions required or
prohibited by the provisions.
3. Amend section 157(a) to clarify that bylaws may limit or regulate
the ability of boards to adopt poison pills.
4. Amend section 109 to clarify that if a shareholder bylaw so
specifies, the board may not amend or repeal that bylaw.
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All but the second of these changes are possible results under the existing
statutory and case law scheme and all follow from the best interpretations of
the existing scheme. There is considerable uncertainty on three of the points,
however, with strong arguments both for and against these results. This
uncertainty has continued for many years, and it would be useful for the legis-
lature to step in and end it. The Delaware Supreme Court has taken an implau-
sible position on the second suggested amendment.
This article proceeds as follows: Part I provides both policy and legal
background. It summarizes the current state of the relevant law in Delaware,
and presents policy arguments in favor of the results advocated here. Part Ut
presents the details of the proposed changes to the Delaware statutes.
11. BACKGROUND
Most rules in the corporation law of Delaware, as well as other states,
are default rules. That is, an individual corporation may choose to follow a
different rule than that which the statute sets forth. The corporation law also
explicitly or implicitly prescribes what a corporation must do to opt out of any
particular default rule. These rules prescribing how to opt out of the statutory
defaults have been called "altering rules. ,2 Altering rules regulate how easy or
hard it is to opt out of a default rule-that is, how "sticky" the default rule is.
3
Altering rules also help allocate authority among different actors within
corporations.
One of the main ways in which corporations alter statutory defaults is
through provisions in the certificate of incorporation or in the bylaws.
Altering rules may allow a corporation to opt out of the statutory default, either
only in the certificate, or in either the certificate or in the bylaws. It matters
which method the altering rule allows because amending the certificate
requires approval by both the board and stockholders,4 while amending the
bylaws can be done by either the board or the stockholders alone.5 Thus, an
altering rule which allows for altering through the bylaws is less sticky than
one which allows for change only through the certificate and not the bylaws.
The distribution of authority is also different, though in a rather tricky way;
either the board or the shareholders can act on their own to amend the bylaws.
Thus, bylaw amendments have been an important tool for activist shareholders
2Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 6 (2006); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky
Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383, 393 (2007).3See supra note 2.4DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2006).
51d. § 109(a).
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trying to reign in boards, but they are also an important tool for boards trying to
solidify their position.
As a result, bylaws have become an important source of political and
scholarly debate in recent years. Shareholder activists have tried to use bylaw
proposals to seize a degree of power in a variety of ways:
1. Trying to get more control over the process of voting for directors
through majority voting and proxy access bylaws.6
2. Trying to limit perceived excessive executive compensation
through "say on pay" bylaws.7
3. Trying to limit the ability of boards to entrench themselves with
antitakeover devices through poison pill bylaws.
8
Scholars sympathetic to shareholder activists have argued for the legality and
usefulness of such bylaws. 9 Boards have opposed all of these, not only by
seeking negative votes on such proposals, but also by seeking to exclude such
shareholder proposals from the corporate proxy materials and by arguing that
various shareholder bylaw proposals are invalid under Delaware (or other
state) law. Scholars sympathetic to boards have given reasons why an
expansive shareholder bylaw power is both unattractive and also does not
conform with existing law.'0
Two main arguments, both drawn from law and economics analyses,
argue for giving shareholders broad powers to use bylaws to shape the
contours of authority and governance within a corporation. The first argu-
ment points to the value of making it easy to experiment and to shape partic-
ular rules for each corporation. This argument focuses on the optimal
degree of stickiness in altering rules, and maintains that low stickiness is
generally best. The second argument points to the importance of controlling
6RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2007 POSTSEASON REPORT: A CLOSER LOOK AT ACCOUNT-
ABIITY AND ENGAGEMENT 3-6 (2007), http:lwww.riskmetrics.comlpdfl2007PostSeasonReport
FINAL.pdf.71d. at 6.
81d.
9John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of
Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 605, 613-16 (1997); Brett H. McDonnell,
Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205,252-
53 (2005).
I°STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 45-48 (2002);
Lawrence A. Hanermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back
the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 467-75 (1998).
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the agency costs that come with the separation of ownership and control in
large public corporations. This argument focuses on how altering rules
allocate authority and maintains that shareholders could use a modest boost of
authority over directors and officers.
One of the key early insights in the modem application of economics to
corporate law was that much of corporate law provides default rules rather than
mandatory rules, and that this is a good thing." Default rules provide a
flexibility that is valuable for several reasons. They allow individual
corporations to tailor the rules to what is best for them in their individual
circumstances.' 2 One-size-fits-all rules are likely to be a bad fit for many
businesses and default rules should make it easy for them to modify the off-
the-rack settings that corporation law provides. Default rules also allow
companies to escape statutory rules that have been set poorly. Under a
majoritarian approach, the legislature should set most default rules in the way
that a majority of companies would prefer. Unfortunately, even if the legisla-
ture tries to do so, it will sometimes get things wrong. When that happens, it
helps if companies can easily opt out of the poorly set default rules. When
many companies then choose to opt out, not only will the individual choices
help those companies avoid the costs that follow from a bad rule, but the fact
of mass opting out may show the legislature it made a mistake. A related
benefit of default rules is that they allow for experimentation, so that individ-
ual companies can try out differing approaches. If a particular rule proves
successful for the companies that adopt it, others can then adopt that rule, and
ultimately the legislature may choose to make it the default rule.
These are well-known benefits of having default rules rather than
mandatory rules. Once the focus is on altering rules, and on how easy it is for
companies to opt out of the default rules, a straightforward extension of the
argument for having default rules suggests that altering rules should be set to
allow companies to opt out easily, cheaply, and quickly. As pointed out above,
allowing a company to opt out in the bylaws is easier, cheaper, and quicker
than requiring it to opt out in the certificate. Thus, the standard arguments in
favor of default rules also work as arguments in favor of altering rules that
allow opting out through the bylaws.
A second key insight gained from applying economics to corporate law
has been an understanding of the agency problems that come from the
separation of ownership from control in large public corporations. Although
"FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword, The Debate on Contractual Freedom
in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396-98 (1989).
12Bebchuk, supra note 11, at 1404.
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recognized as an issue at least since Berle and Means, 13 modern economics-
based scholarship on firms and corporations has usefully understood corporate
governance through an agency-cost prism. 1 4 On this understanding, much of
corporate law and corporate governance focuses on controlling and guiding the
discretion of directors and officers who have the ability to direct the flow of
huge piles of money, which they are supposed to be investing for the benefit of
others, but which they may choose to divert for their own personal benefit. If
we understand this as the, or at least a, leading goal of corporate law, then it
would seem that shareholders should be able to shape the rules of corporate
governance within a company on their own, without requiring board approval.
Why allow the board a veto over governance rules when controlling that board
is one of the main goals of those rules? This has been a key theme of much
work by Professor Lucian Bebchuk.' 5
Within the bounds of contemporary American corporate law, the main
source for shareholder initiatives to shape corporate governance without board
approval is the bylaws.' 6 This leads to a natural recommendation of an
expansive bylaw power. A complication with this recommendation is that
boards can amend the bylaws themselves, without shareholder approval. The
board, as well as shareholders, can use an expansive bylaw power, and boards
may be more likely than shareholders to frequently amend the bylaws. This
problem leads to two suggested solutions. First, one could have more use of
provisions that allow a rule to be set by shareholder-enacted bylaws but not
board-enacted bylaws. Such provisions are seen occasionally, but rarely, in
corporate law. 17 Second, one could allow shareholder-enacted bylaws to forbid
"ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-118 (1932).
S4For key economics literature that has influenced modern legal scholarship, see, e.g.,
OLIVERE. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); R.H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). Easterbrook and Fischel played
the leading role in incorporating law and economics into contemporary legal scholarship in a series
of articles that culminated in their highly influential book. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 11.
15See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REv. 833 (2005).
16Professor Bebchuk has called for allowing shareholders to amend the certificate without
board approval, a power which shareholders in many other countries have. See id. at 865-68. I have
much sympathy for that suggestion, but it goes a step further than the proposals here.
17See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2006) (allowing classified boards to be created
in the certificate of incorporation, by an initial bylaw, or a bylaw adopted by a vote of the
stockholders).
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further change by the board to such bylaws, so that where shareholders want to
take action, they are able to thereafter block board action on that matter. This
is one suggestion discussed in the following part.
Are there any good public-spirited policy reasons, as opposed to special
pleading by managers and their allies, to fear a relatively expansive under-
standing of bylaw power? Three common arguments strike me as the most
plausible. First, special interest shareholders may abuse the bylaw power to
pursue their own interests at the expense of other shareholders. Second,
strong, hard-to-alter board authority may be critical to the economic efficiency
of large corporations. Third, a grant of broad authority to the board, combined
with powerful fiduciary duties to shareholders, is the central traditional
structural characteristic of Delaware corporations.
Two of the leading types of institutional shareholder activists are union
pension funds and public employee pension funds. Critics charge that these
sort of funds seek to advance specialized group, personal, or political interests
that are at odds with the interests of other shareholders. 18 There is some
systematic evidence for this in the case of labor union funds, 19 and more
anecdotal evidence for both types. However, if one considers the main sorts of
shareholder activist proposals today that have a decent chance of passage, they
would appear mostly focused on general shareholder interests, including:
majority voting, advisory votes on compensation, board declassification, pay
for performance, independent board chairs, and rescinding supermajority
requirements. 20 Moreover, as Professor Lucian Bebchuk has argued, share-
holder activists can succeed only where they can persuade a majority to vote on
their side, which greatly reduces the possibility of successful special interest
manipulation.2'
The second argument against an expansive shareholder bylaw power is
that entrenched board authority is critical to the efficiency of large corpo-
rations. Professor Stephen Bainbridge argues this extensively in a series of
1 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 601,633-34 & n.88 (2006); see generally Roberta Romano, Public Pension FundActivism in
Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 795 (1993).
19See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders:
Evidence from Proxy Voting (unpublished manuscript), available at http://home.uchicago.edu/-
aagrawal/AGRAWAL paper.pdf.
2 See RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 6, at 6.2
'See Bebchuk, supra note 15, at 885. Stephen Bainbridge has interesting responses to this
argument. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARv. L. REv. 1735, 1756-57 (2006); Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian
Moment: A Review of "The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice," 34 DEL J. CORP.
L. (forthcoming 2009), available at http//ssm.com/abstract=1248289 (responding to Professor
Bainbridge's counterarguments).
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articles and books on what he calls "director primacy. ' 22 His core argument
draws heavily on the work of Kenneth Arrow, who argues that there is a
tradeoff between authority and responsibility. Effective authority is crucial for
an organization with many members, in order to overcome problems of
differing information and incentives for differing members. Accountability
mechanisms are important to limit abuses of authority. If those accountability
mechanisms go too far, however, they undermine the advantages of authority
by removing all real power from those in charge-the power to review all
decisions at any time differs little from the power to simply make those
decisions in the first place.23
Professor Bainbridge is right to emphasize the tradeoff between
authority and responsibility. He is also perceptive in his analysis of the value
of both, and in his insistence that we should not go too far in striving for
responsibility at the expense of authority. Too often, however, he uses the
existence of a tradeoff to argue against even modest attempts at corporate
accountability. 24 Allowing shareholder bylaws to set rules of procedure and
corporate governance does not give shareholders power over any and all
business decisions. Far from it. Indeed, those of us who advocate bylaws
governing such matters explicitly distinguish them from ordinary business
decisions, which cannot be made through the bylaws.25
A third argument against an expansive shareholder bylaw power stresses
the fundamental structural role of directors as corporate fiduciaries. Directors
hold the most power and most responsibility within the corporation. The law
guards against misuse of this power through the fiduciary duties it imposes
upon directors. Shareholders do not have such fiduciary duties; therefore,
allowing them to exercise power through the bylaws would give power to
unaccountable actors.26
Fiduciary duty law, however, provides only an imperfect, incomplete
check on board power. Moreover, the Delaware courts have recognized that
the shareholder franchise is a key structural fact underlying and legitimizing
22BAINBRIDGE, supra note 10, at 191-240; STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 11-12 (2008); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2002); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
547, 550 (2003).23 
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 78 (1974).
2AMcDonnell, supra note 21, at 14-17.
2Coffee, supra note 9; McDonnell, supra note 9, at 222-23.
26 Frederick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker, Power to the Franchise or the
Fiduciaries?: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 749
(2008).
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the broad grant of authority to the board.27 An important use of bylaws is to
bolster the shareholder franchise. Thus, expansive bylaw power is consistent
with the traditional division of authority between a board of directors and
shareholders in Delaware.
Thus, on policy grounds, shareholders should be able to use bylaws to
set basic rules of corporate governance and procedure to be followed in
running the company. Shareholders can then tailor the rules of their own
company to limit potential board misbehavior, while leaving the board with the
authority to make business decisions.28 What does existing Delaware law say
on the subject? That question does not have a clear answer for many bylaws.
Many statutory provisions do allow bylaws to govern various specific topics.
29
For instance, bylaws may delegate board powers to committees 30 or authorize
classes of persons to call special shareholder meetings. 31 Other statutory
provisions mention specific areas where the certificate of incorporation may set
rules. By relatively clear negative implication, the failure to mention the
bylaws for these topics means that bylaws may not be used to set these rules.32
For instance, the certificate, but not the bylaws, can allow for removal without
cause of directors on classified boards33 or allow for cumulative voting.34
Where no such specific provision exists, the law is much murkier.
Commentators have noted a struggle between two general provisions. Section
141(a) gives the board broad authority to manage the affairs of the
corporation.35 Section 109(b), however, provides that the bylaws may "contain
any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of
incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its
affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders,
directors, officers or employees. 36 The question becomes, where a bylaw
would limit board authority in some way, which of these two general
provisions governs?
At least until very recently, case law did not provide much guidance in
resolving this statutory ambiguity. In at least one case, dealing with "no hand"
27Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Arias Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-60 (Del. Ch. 1988).
28For more detailed defenses of this position, see McDonnell, supra note 9, at 237-48.29For fairly comprehensive listings of such provisions, see id. at 219-21; McDonnell, supra
note 2, at 437-39.
30DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (2006).311d. § 211(d).
32See McDonnell, supra note 9, at 219-21 (listing specific provisions governed by bylaws).
33DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (2006).
'41d. § 214.351d. § 141(a).361d. § 109(b).
2008]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
poison pills, the Delaware Supreme Court took a strong stance that "[s]ection
141(a) requires that any limitation on the board's authority be set out in the
certificate of incorporation. 37 This can be seen as a statement that section
141(a) trumps section 109(b) but, as I have argued elsewhere, it is not a very
persuasive statement to that effect because it does not directly consider section
109 and because it is, at least in part, wrong. For instance, in a close
corporation, a limitation on board authority can indisputably be set out in a
shareholder agreement even if that agreement is not put in the certificate.39
Other cases suggest a broad scope for bylaws. A case decided in 1933
stated that "the by-laws are generally regarded as the proper place for the self-
imposed rules and regulations deemed expedient for its convenient functioning
to be laid down."4°  Several more recent cases suggest that bylaws are
presumptively valid41 and give "capacious authority" over a board's process-
es.42 In several recent cases, Delaware judges have recognized that this
question is open under the statute and remains unresolved in the case law.43 A
case decided after the symposium at which this article was presented has given
important new guidance-I shall turn to that case after considering further
background.
There has been a fair amount of scholarly writing on this topic as well.
Two leading articles on the topic stake out the main alternative approaches to
the scope of the bylaw power. Professor Lawrence Hamermesh argues that
bylaws can only regulate in areas where specific provisions of the statute
specify such a power for the bylaws. 4 Therefore, he seems to give no
independent scope to section 109(b).45 Professor John Coffee argues for a
more expansive understanding of the bylaw power. Professor Coffee suggests
the following four lines for determining what bylaws can do:
1. Bylaws can govern fundamental corporate matters, but not ordi-
nary business decisions."
37Quicktum Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998).38See McDonnell, supra note 9, at 230-31.
39DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (2006).
4°Gow v. Consol. Coppermines Corp., 165 A. 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1933).
41Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985).
42Hollinger Intl, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080 (Del. Ch. 2004). See also McDonnell,
supra note 9, at 230-35 (providing a more detailed analysis of these cases).43 Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 846 (Del. Ch. 2004); Gen.
DataComm Indus., Inc. v. Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.l (Del. Ch. 1999).
44Hamermesh, supra note 10, at 428-33.451d. at 451-52.
46Coffee, supra note 9, at 613-14.
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2. Bylaws can provide negative constraints, but not affirmative
orders.
47
3. Bylaws can regulate procedure but not substance.48
4. Bylaws can regulate corporate governance but not business
decisions.
4 9
Professor Coffee does not provide much legal argument for his position, but, in
a recent article, I supported his basic distinctions (especially the last two) with
more detailed legal justification.50
The battle over bylaws has been particularly fierce for two kinds of
bylaws. The first of these regulates the adoption or modification of poison
pills. Poison pills are a central tool in the modem board's kit for blocking
unwanted takeovers. If shareholders could use the bylaws to limit the ability of
boards to adopt pills, that would significantly change the landscape in the
market for corporate control which is one of the main markets that helps
constrain managerial opportunism. 51 It is an open question whether, and what
kind of, pill bylaws are valid in Delaware. The Oklahoma Supreme Court,
interpreting statutory language very close to Delaware's, has held such a bylaw
valid,52 but it is unclear how persuasive Delaware courts would find this. In
my previous analysis of the existing state of the law, I found such bylaws to be
on the borderline of validity, however, more likely than not invalid.53 In part,
this is because using the general distinctions of bylaw validity-procedure
versus substance and corporate governance versus business decisions-the
offering of shareholder rights can easily be placed on either side of each
distinction. More importantly, the specific statutory provision which allows
the creation of poison pills provides that the certificate, but not the bylaws, can
limit the ability of companies to create stock-based rights.54 One can get
around this point by arguing that bylaws can regulate the procedure boards use
4 7
1d.
481d.
491d. at 614.5 0McDonnell, supra note 9, at 252-63.
5 1EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 162-211; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-13 (1965).52Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907, 908 (Okla. 1999).53McDonnell, supra note 9, at 225-26.
54DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(a) (2006).
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to create rights plans and not their ability to do so.55 However, that cuts the
salami mighty thin.
The other type of bylaw that has recently received attention concerns
voting for directors. Two types of voting bylaws have become popular. One
kind provides that, under specified circumstances, some shareholders would be
able to use the corporate proxy material to nominate director candidates.56 This
would make it much cheaper and easier for shareholders to nominate their own
candidates and, thus, might make boards less self-perpetuating. A second kind
of voting bylaw provides for majority, rather than plurality, voting for
directors.57 This would give "vote no" campaigns more bite. In recent years,
many companies have adopted some version of majority voting. Delaware law
was recently revised to help clarify some problems that arise in connection
with majority voting. 8
Particularly after the recent changes, a properly-drafted majority voting
bylaw is unquestionably valid under Delaware law. The statutes are less clear
for shareholder nomination bylaws; however, in my earlier article on bylaws, I
argued that the balance of the arguments clearly suggests that such bylaws are
valid in Delaware.
59
The case law surrounding bylaws changed after a recent decision in CA,
Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan.6° The union pension, a leading
shareholder activist, proposed a bylaw for inclusion in CA's proxy materials.
61
The proposed bylaw provided that if a shareholder nominated a short slate of
board candidates (a slate covering less than half of the positions to be
contested in the election), and succeeded in electing at least one of its
nominees, the corporation would reimburse the shareholder nominator for
reasonable proxy expenses. 62 CA asked the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for a no-action letter allowing it to exclude the proposal.63
The SEC found that whether or not this bylaw could be permitted depended on
Delaware state law.64 Under Rule 14a-8, a proposal is excludable if it is "not a
proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of
55McDonnell, supra note 9, at 225.561d. at 211-12.
57See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of
Directors, 40 CONN. L. REv. 459, 480-83 (2007).58DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2006) (clarifying quorum and voting requirements for
corporations).59McDonnell, supra note 9, at 251.
60953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).61 d. at 229.
621d. at 230.
6 3
1d.
64CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 230.
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the company's organization ' '65 or if it "would... cause the company to violate
any state ... law to which it is subject."66 The SEC certified two questions to
the Delaware Supreme Court: (1) was the bylaw a proper subject for share-
holder action in Delaware, and (2) would the bylaw cause CA to violate any
Delaware law?67
The Delaware Supreme Court found that the reimbursement bylaw was
a proper subject for shareholder action.68 In doing so, the court specifically
avoided formulating a general bright line rule for which shareholder bylaws
are, and are not, valid exercises of power.69 However, it did say that "a proper
function of bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific
substantive business decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures
by which those decisions are made. 70 Thus, the court basically accepted the
procedure versus substance distinction as discussed above. The court had
difficulty classifying this bylaw as substance rather than procedure, but in the
end characterized it as procedural, in large part because it facilitates a
shareholder role in the election of directions, in which shareholders have "a
legitimate and protected interest.'
' 1
The shareholders thus won on the first certified question, but they lost
on the second. The court held that, although the bylaw is valid under the
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), it violates the common law
fiduciary duty imposed on the board.72 The court reasoned that since it had to
rule on the facial validity of the bylaw, rather than as applied in particular
circumstances, and found circumstances where the bylaw might violate the
common law, the bylaw failed under the second certified question. 73 The court
relied upon cases which held that contractual provisions could not require the
board to act in ways that violate its fiduciary duties.74 The court held that the
same rule applies to shareholder-adopted bylaws and rejected the union's
argument that such a bylaw relieves the board of its duties where the bylaw ties
the board's hands.75 In some cases a shareholder might nominate directors
pursuing her own selfish interest, and compensating her might violate the
6517 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2008).
66Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(2).67CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231.
6Id.
69See id. at 234 n.14.701d. at 234-35.
7 CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 235-36.72Id. at 238.
73
1d.
741d. (citing Quicktum Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); Paramount
Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)).75CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 239.
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board's duties. Since the bylaw would, in such cases, require the board to
nonetheless reimburse the shareholder, the bylaw violates Delaware law.
Although the first half of the opinion is a victory for shareholders, the
scope of the second half is unclear and ominous. Virtually all bylaws limit
board discretion in some way, and with some creativity one should almost
always be able to come up with circumstances where doing what the bylaw
requires would force the board to act in a way that violates its duty if it had
discretion to act as it chose. So what bylaws remain valid under CA, Inc.? It
seems clear that poison pill bylaws will fail, unless the bylaw includes a
fiduciary duty out provision. A more difficult question, however, arises from
shareholder access bylaws that lack a fiduciary duty out. My theory is that
such a bylaw runs afoul of CA, Inc., because one can argue that the board has a
duty to exclude selfish shareholders pursuing their own interests and who want
to use the corporate proxy to nominate someone for director. Ultimately, it will
take much litigation before the scope of this principle is understood.
Before discussing any suggestions for statutory changes, I note one other
important question concerning bylaws that remains open under current
statutory and case law. Suppose, for example, shareholders enact a bylaw that
limits board power in a way that the board finds unappealing. Assuming that
the certificate grants the board the power to amend the bylaws, may the board
choose to amend or repeal the shareholder-enacted bylaw? Does the answer to
that question differ depending on whether the shareholder bylaw specifically
says the board may not amend or repeal it?
In some jurisdictions, the relevant statutes clearly provide that the board
may not amend or repeal a shareholder-enacted bylaw if it states that the board
may not amend or repeal it.76 Until recently, nothing in Delaware statutory law
clearly speaks to this point. Dictum in one case says that boards can amend a
shareholder bylaw;77 dictum in another case states the contrary.78 Professor
Hamermesh defends the former position;79 Professor Coffee defends the
latter.8
0
The recent majority-voting amendments address this question for that
specific type of bylaw. Such amendments provide that a shareholder bylaw,
76See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (2007). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 216 (2006) ("A bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be
necessary for the election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of
directors.").
77Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990).
78Am. Intl Rent A Car, Inc. v. Cross, No. 7583, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413 (Del. Ch.
May 9, 1984).
79Hamermesh, supra note 10.
80Coffee, supra note 9, at 616-18.
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which varies the voting requirement for board elections, may not be amended
or repealed by the board of directors. 81 This might create a negative
implication that the board can amend or repeal other kinds of shareholder
bylaws. Why else would there be a need to specifically protect this sort of
bylaw? The legislative history of the new statutory provision, however, says
that it is not intended to affect the answer to the question of the board's power
to amend other sorts of shareholder bylaws.8 2 Thus, this question remains
open for all other shareholder bylaws, besides majority voting bylaws.
111. BYLAW REFORM PROPOSALS
I propose four changes to the DGCL statutes relating to shareholder
bylaws. All four proposals are justified by the policy concerns discussed
above, which I will elaborate further when I discuss each proposal. Three of
the four proposals are already a possible outcome under the existing statute.
However, for each proposal there are also alternative interpretations of exist-
ing law that have strong support in the academic community.83 Adopting my
proposals would assure that the better interpretations of existing law succeed. I
suggest the following four proposals:
1. Codify the procedure/substance and governance/business distinc-
tions to help resolve the tension between sections 109(b) and 141(a)
of the DGCL.
2. Amend section 141(a) to provide that shareholder bylaws or
certificate of incorporation provisions may limit board discretion,
thereby shielding the board from fiduciary duty liability.
3. Amend section 157 to allow shareholder bylaws to regulate the
existence of shareholder-rights plans.
4. Amend Delaware's statutes to clearly state that the board cannot
amend a shareholder bylaw.
"
1DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 216 (2006).
82"This amendment does not address any other situation in which the board of directors
amends a bylaw adopted by a stockholder vote." Synopsis, 2006 Del. Laws c. 306.83See Hamermesh, supra note 10 (providing the strongest arguments for such positions).
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A. Resolving the 109(b)/141(a) Tension
As discussed above, where a bylaw impinges on board authority and is
not either specifically allowed or disallowed by a particular statutory pro-
vision, there is an ongoing debate as to whether section 109(b) allows such a
provision or section 141(a) disallows it. I argue above, and in my previous
works, that as a matter of both interpretation of current law and on policy
grounds, we should allow bylaws that cover procedural matters or help
structure governance. Bylaws that regulate substantive business decisions,
however, should not be allowed. Although I believe this is the best approach
under existing law, some advocate, plausibly, for a more restrictive approach.
84
One way to more clearly write Professor Coffee's approach into law would be
to add the following sentence to the end of section 109(b): "The bylaws may
not be used to manage the affairs of the corporation in violation of the
authority granted to the board of directors under section 141 (a) of this chapter,
but the bylaws may create procedural rules or set general rules for regulating
the governance of the corporation."
This new sentence puts Professor Coffee's strongest two distinctions
explicitly into the statute. The specific reference to section 141(a), in the
amended language, clarifies the relationship between the two sections.
This suggestion was made at the symposium, and prior to the CA, Inc.
decision.85 To the extent that the case has more clearly entrenched the
procedure/substance distinction, this statutory change is now less necessary.
As discussed above and in my previous work, however, the corporate
governance/substance distinction is also useful in drawing the distinction
between valid and invalid bylaws. CA, Inc. does not make that distinction but
it does not exclude it either-it says that defining procedure is "a proper
function of bylaws,",86 suggesting there may be others. Also, the court stresses
that its holding is case specific, and not intended to formulate a general rule for
all cases.87 So, it remains useful to build the corporate governance distinction
into the law along with the procedure distinction.
This suggested statutory language is subject to the criticism that it is
general, vague, and hard to apply.88 What are "procedural rules"? What are
"general rules for regulating the governance of the corporation"? But,
generality is precisely the needed factor that section 109(b) provides for
8See id.
85CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
86 d. at 234 (emphasis added).87 Id.
8
9Hamermesh, supra note 10, at 433-44.
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bylaws. Other specific provisions in the DGCL give clear guidance for many
particular questions.89 The statutes cannot lay out in full detail all items on
which it would be useful for bylaws to govern. Much less can statutes fully
anticipate all questions which may arise in the future. There is a real need for a
general provision to allow for bylaws that do not fit within the four comers of
the more specific parts of the statute. Too much specificity and clarity in this
section of the statute is actually unattractive.
So, how then would one get answers to questions about the validity of
specific bylaws? Courts would develop precedent applying this general
language to specific cases. Indeed, as argued elsewhere, some relevant case
law already exists applying these basic distinctions.9° Applying broad, vague
principles to particular circumstances is utterly central to the identity of
Delaware courts in the area of corporation law. If Delaware courts cannot be
trusted to do that task well, there is a much bigger problem than just how to
develop the law in this one area.
There are other possible ways to modify sections 109 and 141 to
achieve a similar result. One could rewrite section 109(b) to read: "The
bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with the law or with the
certificate of incorporation, relating to the corporation's rights or powers or the
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees, or to the
procedure for governing the corporation." This proposed language drops
existing language concerning "the business of the corporation" and "the
conduct of its affairs," which rather confusingly seems to allow bylaws in the
board's core area of business decisions.91 It adds the language on procedure.
One could supplement this change by adding the following to section 141 (a):
"The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as
may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation
or in its bylaws as provided for elsewhere in this chapter.9 2 (The italic
represents added language.) This proposed language allows for bylaws that
limit board authority, but treats the bylaws differently from rules set forth in
the certificate. Section 141(a) does not restrict the ability of the certificate to
impose limits on board authority. 93 The bylaws, as this is written, could only
provide limits under authority granted elsewhere, including in section 109(b).94
89McDonnell, supra note 2, at 437-39.
9°McDonnell, supra note 9, at 230-35.
9 1DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2006).
9'1d. § 141(a).
931d.
94Id. § 109(b).
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Either way of changing section 109(b) and, perhaps, section 141(a)
would be equivalent in intent and effect. The first proposal is a bit cleaner and
clearer.
B. Amend Section 141(a)
As analyzed above, the recent decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Employees Pension Plan has created a serious obstacle to shareholder bylaws.
It is not clear how to draw the line between bylaws that may illegally force the
board to violate its fiduciary duties in some circumstances, and those that do
not. The case leaves the law as unsettled as it was before, though in a
somewhat different way. One fix is for shareholders to include fiduciary duty
outs in all bylaw proposals that are potentially subject to this objection (which
may well be all bylaw proposals, period). This conclusion, however, leaves
boards with a degree of discretion that may go against the very point of these
bylaws, which seek to limit board discretion in areas where the shareholders do
not trust the board.
The Delaware Supreme Court explicitly says that those who support a
bylaw like the one in question in CA, Inc. "may seek recourse from the
Delaware General Assembly."95 Setting aside the political difficulty, this
statement raises a rather difficult question: how can the General Assembly
amend the Delaware General Corporation Law to undo the result in CA, Inc.?
In my opinion, it is not at all clear. One way would be to remove from boards
the authority, under section 141(a), to manage the affairs of the corporation.
That, though, would throw out the baby with the bathwater-that grant of
authority to the board is central to the identity of modern corporate law.
The following sentence, if added to section 141(a), would assist in
resolving this issue: "If any provision in the certificate of incorporation, or a
bylaw adopted by a vote of the stockholders, limits the discretion of the board
of directors to manage the business and affairs of a corporation, the directors
shall not be held liable for violating their fiduciary duty to the corporation, on
matters where the certificate or bylaw provision prohibit the board of directors
from acting as their fiduciary duty would otherwise have required."
This is not a particularly elegant solution, and the exact wording could
use some revising. Still, the proposed language does seem to counter the
argument in CA, Inc. It would essentially write into the statute the argument
made by AFSCME that the Delaware Supreme Court rejected. AFSCME
argued, in the court's words, "that it is unfair to claim that the Bylaw prevents
95CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008).
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the CA board from discharging its fiduciary duty where the effect of the Bylaw
is to relieve the board entirely of those duties in this specific area. ,96 The court
calls this argument "more semantical than substantive." 97 It is the court's
response, however, that is unpersuasive. The whole point of the board's
fiduciary duty is to give the board great discretion in running the corporation's
affairs, with the expectation that the board will exercise that discretion honestly
and in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. However,
where the beneficiaries of that duty, the shareholders, have decided to limit the
board's discretion because they do not trust the board on a particular matter, the
need for a fiduciary duty limitation on the board ceases. If a bylaw does
indeed fall within the valid scope of the bylaw power, as the first part of CA,
Inc. held was true for the reimbursement bylaw, then the shareholders have the
power to use such a bylaw to limit the board. The suggested amendment to
section 141(a) recognizes that invocation of the board's fiduciary duty to limit
that bylaw power makes no sense.
Note that the suggested amendment covers only bylaws adopted by a
vote of the stockholders. This recognizes the valid principle of cases like
QVC0 8 and Quickturn99 that the court cites in CA, Inc. Where the board opts to
limit its own future power, there is reason to distrust-the board could well be
doing so to entrench itself, as certainly seems to be the case in Quickturn.
However, where shareholders, not the board, are setting the limits on the
board, that concern is not present. The court in CA, Inc. did not accept that
distinction, but the court does not offer a good policy reason for why the
distinction is wrong.' ° In fact, the distinction makes great sense.
C. Amend Section 157
Section 157 gives corporations the right to create rights or options to
acquire shares of stock.'0 ' Section 157 is the key statutory source for the
authority to create shareholder rights plans, or poison pills. 102 Section 157(a)
begins: "Subject to any provisions in the certificate of incorporation, every
corporation may create and issue ... rights or options entitling the holders
thereof to acquire from the corporation any shares of its capital stock of any
96d. at 239.
97id.
9 8Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
9Quicktum Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
I"°CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 239.
01DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(a) (2006).
I2Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351-53 (Del. 1985).
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class or classes .... ,.03 This references the certificate but not the bylaws,
creating a strong negative implication that provisions of this sort must be
contained in the certificate and not the bylaws. I have argued that this creates
the strongest argument against the use of bylaws to limit the authority of
boards to enact poison pills. 10 4
On balance, poison pill bylaws would be a useful tool for shareholders
to possess. As economists and corporate law scholars have argued for decades,
the market for corporate control is potentially one of the most useful limits on
director and officer opportunism, and one of the strongest spurs for vigorous
and faithful pursuit of shareholder interests. 105 Over the last two decades,
Delaware law has made it awfully easy for boards to protect against unwanted
takeovers, and poison pills are one critical part of that defense system. Thus,
giving shareholders some initiative power to limit the creation of poison pills
would be quite useful.
The solution to the section 157(a) obstacle to poison pill bylaws is
simple. One should simply add the phrase "or a bylaw enacted by the
stockholders" following the phrase "certificate of incorporation" at the begin-
ning of section 157(a). 1°6 This additional language would negate the argu-
ment that bylaws cannot limit the board's ability to create or modify poison
pills. I would limit this reference to bylaws adopted by a vote of the stock-
holders-this device should be used more often, in order to extend a power to
shareholders, while limiting the ability of boards to further entrench them-
selves with the same power.
107
D. Amending Shareholder Bylaws
As discussed above, it remains an open question in Delaware whether
the board may amend or repeal a shareholder-enacted bylaw. Nothing in
Delaware statutory law clearly addresses this question. Nothing in the case law
provides a clear answer either, with dicta in two cases pointing in oppo-
site directions. 108
10 3DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(a) (2006).
'04McDonnell, supra note 9, at 225. As I point out above, one may be able to avoid this
conclusion by arguing that bylaws may regulate the procedure by which a board adopts or modifies a
pill plan, even though they cannot regulate the basic existence or nature of such a plan. The
distinction, however, is not easy to maintain.
""Manne, supra note 51, at 113.
'06DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(a) (2006).
107See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
'OsSee supra notes 58-78 and accompanying text.
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Other jurisdictions provide clearer answers. For instance, the Model
Business Corporation Act (Model Act) provides that "[a] corporation's board
of directors may amend or repeal the corporation's bylaws, unless: . .. (2) the
shareholders in amending, repealing, or adopting a bylaw expressly provide
that the board of directors may not amend, repeal, or reinstate that bylaw."l°9
Thus, under the Model Act, if a shareholder bylaw says nothing on the point,
the board may amend or repeal the bylaw, but if the shareholder bylaw
specifies that the board may not amend or repeal the bylaw, then the board may
not.
The Model Act approach is clearly the sensible answer to this question.
Shareholders have the power to amend the bylaws, and part of the point of that
power must be to put some constraints on board actions. Yet, given the much
greater speed and ease of board action, if the board can simply undo what
shareholders have done in amending the bylaws, the shareholder bylaw power
will have little point. 0
There are several slightly varying ways to get at a similar result. I see
three basic alternatives:
1. The board can amend a shareholder bylaw unless the shareholder
bylaw states the board cannot do so (this is the Model Act's
approach).' 11
2. The board cannot amend a shareholder bylaw at all (this is the
approach of DGCL section 216 for majority vote bylaws).' 2
3. The board cannot amend a shareholder bylaw unless the bylaw (or
perhaps the certificate) provides that the board can so amend.
The second alternative seems like an overly mandatory approach. If the
shareholders in a particular corporation want to give the board the power to
amend shareholder bylaws, at least for some such bylaws, then why not allow
them to do so?
As between alternatives (1) and (3), I am a bit skeptical about general
certificate provisions allowing the board to amend shareholder bylaws. We
109MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 10.20(b)(2) (2007).
"
0Shareholders might be able to get around this problem by placing procedural limits on the
ability of the board to amend a bylaw. Even that, however, is debated as a matter of existing law.
See Hamermesh, supra note 10, at 467-75.
1"MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (2007).1 12DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2006).
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might well see newly public companies start including such provisions in their
certificates at the time of their IPOs, and I doubt that market discipline is
sufficiently strong to protect against that reaction. Thus, I would leave the
choice for opting in or out of the default rule as a matter for each specific
bylaw.
The question remains whether Delaware law should require shareholder
bylaws to opt in to a no-amendment rule (alternative (1)) or to opt out of a no-
amendment rule (alternative (3)). Alternative (1) creates a bit of a trap for
unaware and poorly advised shareholders, who might neglect to include a no-
amendment clause without knowledge of the consequences of doing so. On
the other hand, alternative (3) creates an opposing trap, both for those drafting
shareholder bylaws and perhaps, more importantly, for those voting on them,
and it seems unlikely that shareholder bylaw advocates would specifically
choose to allow boards to undo their handiwork. Therefore, I prefer alternative
(1) slightly over the other alternatives.
The first alternative would probably best be adopted as an amendment
to section 109. One could add a new sentence to the end of section 109(a)
stating, "The board of directors or governing body may not amend, repeal, or
reinstate a bylaw where the stockholders, in amending, repealing, or adopting a
bylaw, expressly provide that the board of directors or governing body may not
amend, repeal, or reinstate that bylaw."
IV. CONCLUSION
The rules governing what a corporation may and may not accomplish
through its bylaws help shape how easily individual companies can tailor their
rules, and who gets to decide what those rules include. Bylaw amendments
give shareholders their only power of initiative.
To make that power optimally valuable, shareholders should be able to
use the bylaws to set procedural and governance rules, including rules
governing board nominations and the creation of poison pills. For this share-
holder power to be meaningful, the shareholders must be able to guard against
immediate board changes to the rules they have set.
The four changes to Delaware statutes which I propose here would
conform the law to these ideas. It may be that the existing statutory language
already achieves the same result for some of the suggested changes; however,
there has been enough uncertainty on these questions for a long enough time
that the legislature should step in and clarify that these are indeed the right
results under Delaware law.
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